Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 56 | Issue 4

Article 1

4-1-1981

Judicialization of Trade Law
Peter D. Ehrenhaft

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Judicialization of Trade Law, 56 Notre Dame L. Rev. 595 (1981).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol56/iss4/1

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

The "Judicialization" of Trade Law
Peter D. EhrenhafJ *
I.

The Importance of Foreign Trade
A.

Current Trade Scene

The modern world has been likened to a "global village," a metaphor
brought home to us by images from far-flung places racing across our television
screens. But if telecommunications media comprise the windows of that village,
trade constitutes its common currency.
Regardless of our predilections, our dependence on foreign sources of supply
is not a matter of theory or prediction but a settled fact. The most publicized
example, of course, is oil, which flowed into our country at a rate exceeding 6.7
million barrels per day in 1980.1 We now rely on imports for 40% of our petroleum needs. For certain strategic minerals, the percentages are higher: 50% of
our tungsten, 57% of our mercury, 62% of our zinc, 77% of our nickel, 81% of our
tin, 92% of our chromium, 93% of our bauxite and aluminum, 98% of our manganese, and fully 100% of our industrial diamonds come from abroad.2 These items
are neither exotica nor luxuries. Cobalt, nickel, and manganese, for example, are
crucial raw materials in the production of alloy steels used in machine tools, gas
turbines and jet engines. Trade thus has a profound bearing on our national
security and industrial well-being.
As a matter of elementary economics, the United States must export goods
to generate enough foreign exchange to be able to import what we need and
want from other nations. Similarly, since foreign countries must obtain U.S. dollars to purchase our goods, we must provide access to our markets for foreign
traders. In 1980 we spent approximately 244.8 billion dollars to buy merchandise abroad, and sold 220.6 billion dollars worth of our exports to our trading
partners. 3 The percentage of our gross national product devoted to foreign trade
has doubled since 1970, and should increase substantially-perhaps even double
again-in the next decade.
The world's increasing economic interdependence has obvious political
ramifications. Our sanctions against Iran, for example, were economic ones, including trade restrictions requiring the cooperation of numerous allies. When
Russian troops marched into Afghanistan, our response was not military but
mercantile, consisting primarily of severe reductions in exports of agricultural
*
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commodities and high technology products. Now more than ever before trade
has become an instrument of our foreign policy.
We may employ this instrument as a carrot as well as a stick. When developing nations seek preferential treatment under our trade laws, we must be prepared to make delicate decisions. Even aside from humanitarian objectives
(some 900 million people
in the less developed countries are classified as living in
"absolute poverty" 4), steady economic development is needed to ensure political
stability in many regions of the world, including that of our Latin American
neighbors. Their expanding economies provide the fastest growing markets for
many of our exports, including technology with which our own or other industrialized markets may be saturated. If the trade of developing nations does not
generate sufficient foreign exchange earnings to enable them to pay for their
needs, now including $500 billion in debt service-debts largely incurred for im5
ported oil-the economic leverage of oil-producing countries can only increase.
Both as outlets for our technology and equipment and as sources for crucial raw
materials, developing nations require sensitive, finely balanced adjustments in
our trade policies.
But today's pace of change is such that adjustments are harder to accomplish and more expensive than ever before. As efficient competitors proliferate
throughout the world, our technological prowess is challenged even in our home
markets. Twenty years ago, there was little foreign steel in the United States; by
the end of the 1970's foreign manufacturers had captured close to one-half of all
Western markets, and the United States imported over twenty million tons per
year. 6 Despite import retrictions, foreign textile products currently comprise 12%
of our domestic consumption. 7 Passenger car imports have increased from 16%
of domestic production in 1973 to 38% of domestic production in 1980. 8 And
these bare figures do not begin to indicate the magnitude of the adjustments
occasioned by changing competitive conditions. With U.S. auto production
down 35%, more than 300,000 auto workers have been laid off since 1978. 9
When United States Steel Corporation decides to close a plant in Utah, 5,500
steelworkers and another 11,000 in support jobs are unemployed, causing a billion dollar decline in Utah's economy.'O Entire cities become "outdated" as their
industrial hearts respond arrhythmically to the pace of change.
It may be pleasing in theory to suggest that market forces and the "invisible
hand" will ultimately make the appropriate adjustments. But the idea of "government as caretaker," born in the Depression and brought to fruition during a
period of unprecedented economic prosperity, has given us rising expectations for
stability and security which we will not easily relinquish. Developments of the
sort witnessed over the past decade-deterioration of our comparative trade posi4 Samuelson, Don't Break the Bank, 12 NAT'L J. 1025 (1980).
5 Bowen, Closing the Trade Cap Could Take Ten Years, FORTUNE, July 14, 1980, at 134.
6 Hearng on Efects ofSteel Industr , Closing on Small Businesses and Local Communities Before the Senate Select
Committee on Small Business, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1980) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (hereinafter cited
as 1980 hlearings.
7

FTC STAFF REPORT, EFFECTS OF RESTRICTIONS ON U.S.

IMPORTS:

FIVE CASE STUDIES AND

THEORY, 139 (1980).
8 Petition for Relief of Ford Motor Co. at 21-22, Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis and Bodies
7herefor, USITC Pub. 110 (Dec. 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 85194 (1980).
9 Id. at2.
10 1980 Hearings, supra note 6, at 5.
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tion, the oil embargo and the tenfold increase in the price of imported fuel, deficits in our merchandise trade, massive inflation, loss of the value of the dollar,
declines in productivity-seem thrust upon us, not of our own making and involving forces so large that they cry out for government involvement.
B.

Trade in the Past.- The Legal Approach

If, as a recent Commerce Department publication reminds us, Americans
are simply not accustomed to thinking of themselves as part of the world economy, it is because for much of our history we could afford to be parochial. Foreign trade has always involved less of our gross national product than it does
elsewhere. 1 In a land of enormous size and seemingly limitless natural resources,
we could believe in self-reliance; more importantly, we could practice it. The
frontier was not only a laboratory for developing native customs and institutions,
as Frederick Jackson Turner taught us, but it also provided a natural safety valve
for internal pressures. Problems of adjustment could always be solved by internal
growth, by "going West."
Whatever problems remained could be resolved, we believed, by our system
of law. In the 1830's de Tocqueville observed that America's legal profession
already constituted its "aristocracy," and that the language and spirit of the law
permeated American culture. "It must not be forgotten," de Tocqueville wrote
of lawyers, "that if they prize the free institutions of their country much, they
nevertheless value the legality of those institutions far more; they are less afraid of
tyranny than of arbitrary power."' 2 A speaker at a recent discussion of the comparative competitive positions of the Japanese and U.S. auto industries suggested
the surging success of the Japanese is partly due to two facts: first, that in Japan
there is one lawyer serving every 10,000 citizens; while in the United States there
are twenty; and second, that 400 engineers per 10,000 citizens do design and
logistics work in Japan, compared to seventy here. 3 We have a brain drain toward law rather than production; a devotion to arguing rather than doing. It is
perhaps no accident that the very first law enacted by our Congress, the Judiciary Act of 1789, established the courts and provided work for lawyers. And lawyers are as busy at it today as then.
But we are also beginning to sense reactions to an excess of laws and regulations, to overcrowded court dockets, to the flood of law school graduates. Chief
Judge Paul Buchanan of the Indiana Court of Appeals has vividly described how
the public is drowning in tides of trivial lawsuits, citing among many the case
two college seniors brought against their university because their shower curtains
were inadequate.14 In a perceptive talk, former Attorney General Edward Levi
deplored the obligations of our courts to become, in effect, receivers of our
schools, prisons, hospitals and (why not?) sick communities as once they presided
over bankrupt railroads.15 Chief Justice Warren Burger's Annual Report cites a
by-now familiar 100 percent increase in just ten years in the case loads of the
11 See, e.g., J. VOLPE, ASSESSING U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN WORLD MARKETS
12 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 295 (Aldine ed. 1901).
13

1 (1979).

Hope, Eight Vi in World Auto Market, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Jan. 12, 1981, at 7, col. 3.

14 Buchanan, Can theJudia,7 Solve Everybody's Problem?, SWARTHMORE C. BULL., Nov., 1980, at 1.
15 E. Levi, The Sovereigny of the Courts, at 15 (July 1980) (unpublished lecture at the Salzburg
Seminar on American Law and Legal Institutions).
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federal courts of appeal. 16
Nonetheless, we retain a confidence in law as a check on "arbitrary power."
We still cling to legal processes-with all their transparency and neutrality-as
ultimate arbiters in the determination of public policy. Sometimes, in an excess
of devotion, we create legal procedures precisely to permit our politicians to
avoid taking responsibility for making difficult choices.
In the field of international trade, the Trade Agreements Act of 197917 and
the recent conversion of our humble Customs Court into an exalted Court of
International Trade I8 demonstrate our long-standing faith in the power of legal
machinery. It is a faith, I believe, that deserves questioning.
Although we are not alone in the world in committing our trade problems to
a legal process, much of the international legal regime in this area is of our own
making. As a recent article in the New York Times aptly observed, "[i]n the postwar world, American law, like the American dollar, passed as common currency."' 19 Even in the midst of World War II we had resolved, along with Great
Britain, to create machinery to promote international cooperation in the field of
trade. What resulted from postwar negotiations was the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT),20 consisting of both a set of legal agreements and an
ongoing organization.
On paper, GATT contained commitments on maximum tariffs and a general principle of nondiscrimination embodied in a Most-Favored-Nation clause.
But worldwide social, political, and economic conditions would not long remain
frozen in the mold envisioned in 1947. With rapidly changing conditions and an
enormously enlarged membership, GATT, like many other legal institutions, had
to adapt to survive. An interesting dichotomy has emerged. On the one hand,
the old reliance on legal rules has been replaced by a greater stress on the search
for consensus. Equity has replaced justice and accommodation has supplanted
retaliation as the guidelines for GATT responses. 2' On the other hand, GATT
has just concluded an enormous new effort at rulemaking and institution-building in the American image.
The Multilateral Trade Negotiations were concluded in 1979 after more
than four years of hard bargaining to expand and perfect the GATT regime.
These negotiations focused on the spread of a variety of preferential tariff agreements and non-tariff trade barriers that had become the paramount source of
trade problems as tariff levels everywhere receded in significance. Specifically,
two major categories of non-tariff barrier issues had to be addressed. On the one
hand, access to markets was being restricted by a variety of tactics, including
protectively tailored customs valuation codes and stringent product standards
that discriminated-intentionally or not-against imports. On the other hand,
16 W. BURGER, CHIEF JUSTICE's END OF THE YEAR STATEMENT 13 (1980).
17 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified in scattered sections of 5,
13, 19, 26 and 28 U.S.C.).
18 Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 101, 94 Stat. 1727 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 251).
19 Birenbam & Johnson, U.S. Law Under Fire, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 26, 1980, at 19A, col. 1.
20 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 182 [hereinafter cited as
GATT].
21 The dichotomy was well illustrated by an Indonesian diplomat who spoke scornfully of the Americans' symbol of justice as a "blindfolded woman with a sword"--the last person in the world he would
trust to dispense justice. He said his nation's symbol ofjustice was a large shade tree under whose benevolent branches everyone could seek shelter from the fierce noon sun.

[Vol. 56:595]

"JUDICIALIZATION" OF TRADE LAW

in a time of slack demand and worldwide recession, nations were increasingly
tempted to promote exports in an effort to shift their domestic problems overseas
and to earn dollars with which to buy oil.
In essence, the problems of insuring access to markets and of curing the "exportation" of internal adjustment pressures mean that international competition
can flourish only if it is conducted in a fair and open manner that avoids "beggar
thy neighbor" approaches. True to our traditions, our efforts to find a solution
seized instinctively upon legal remedies. Codes were enacted to combat the
22
"dumping" of underpriced goods and the subsidization of inefficient producers, 23
and incidentally to avoid arbitrary valuation and standardization practices.
Thus we arrive at our legal point of departure. For if the recent changes in our
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty laws24 represent the problems of international trade writ small, they provide us with an instructive case study of the dangers of applying legal forms and processes to matters of trade policy.
II. New Wine in Old Bottles: Current Trade Laws
Use Traditional Means to Deal with New Phenomena
A.

The Law of CountervailingDuties

"Countervailing duties" are duties imposed to offset grants or subsidies conferred by foreign sources on producers of imported merchandise. The theory is
that subsidization distorts trade patterns and discriminates against U.S. producers of competitive goods. Yet much of the rest of the world-and, it must fairly
be said, the United States itself-view the subsidization of industry and agriculture as a legitimate exercise of national policy. 25 All nations now shape their
domestic economy and, in the process, many encourage the growth of particular
sectors-in particular those that produce for export. Why, then, should our trading partners defer to our negative views of subsidization? The answer is that for
a long time they did because they had to.
1. History of Countervailing Duty Law
Since U.S. countervailing duty legislation antedated the GATT, it was exempted from the GATT regime under a grandfather clause. 26 As early as 1890, a
countervailing duty law was passed to protect domestic sugar interests against a
subsidy granted exporters of Russian sugar specifically to overcome the high U.S.
protective tariff.2 7 The first general countervailing duty statute, adopted in the
22 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done April 12, 1979, MTN/NTM/W/236; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done April 9, 1979,
MTN/NTM/W/232.
23 Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done
April 12, 1979, MTN/NTM/W/229/Rev. 1; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, done March 29,
1979, MTN/NTM/W/192/Rev. 5.
24 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, tits. I, X (to be codified in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.).
25 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII, supra note 22, art.
11:1 at 21.
26 See Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
27 Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 237, 26 Stat. 584.
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Tariff Act of 1897,28 authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to impose duties on
dutiable goods equal to the net amount of any subsidy on exportation bestowed
by a foreign government. Since the law was ostensibly intended to combat what
was regarded as inherently "unfair"-namely, requiring domestic producers to
compete against foreigners receiving their government's financial aid-no "injury" to the domestic industry arising from the subsidized imports needed to be
established to trigger the countervailing duty mechanism.
By the 1920's, the law was expanded to permit the Secretary to levy duties
on imports subsidized by anj foreign source, public or private. 29 Further, benefits
no longer had to be tied to exportation to be countervailed, since manufacturing
and production subsidies were also brought within the scope of the law.
Throughout this early period and until 1974, great discretion was vested in the
Secretary to define and take action against foreign subsidization. A number of
factors, however, counseled prudence in the Secretary's use of this power.
First, the absence of an injury test made the Secretary reluctant to affront
our foreign trading partners by stretching the law to its theoretical limits. Under
the GATT, no countervailing duties could be imposed unless the subsidization
caused or threatened "material injury" to a competing domestic industry. 30 Because U.S. law required no such showing of injury to domestic producers, the
erection of import barriers through countervailing duties despite lack of injury to
domestic producers was viewed abroad as blatant protectionism. Theories of free
trade, undistorted by subsidies, were unconvincing.
Second, subsidies are widely viewed as desirable levers of social and economic change. Under GATT, for example, the only checks upon domestic subsidies had been notification and consultation procedures 3 '-checks largely ignored
in practice. As the role of governments in economic planning becomes more pervasive, it becomes possible to find "subsidization" at every turn: U.S. authorities
have found them in regional development programs, 32 research and development
aid to industry,3" and tax incentives3 4 to help sectors in the economy deemed
vital to a nation's welfare. Stringent enforcement of countervailing duties as a
sanction against foreign governments' involvement in such efforts could be
viewed by those governments as an unwarranted interference in their internal
affairs.
2.

Injury and "Discipline": A Trade-Off

The lack of an injury standard in U.S. law became increasingly unacceptable to our trading partners; at the same time, their recalcitrance in accepting
"discipline" on subsidies was unacceptable to a United States Congress concerned with safeguarding domestic industry against subsidized competition. The
28 Tariff Act of 1897, ch. II, § 5, 30 Stat. 205.
29 Eg., Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IV(E), 38 Stat. 193, and the act superseding it, the Tariff Act of
1922, ch. 356, tit. III, § 303, 42 Stat. 935 (repealed by the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, tit. III § 651, 46 Stat.
762). The current version is at 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303 (West 1980).
30 GATT, supra note 20, at art. VI:5.
31 GATT, supra note 20, at art. XVI:1.
32 ASG Industries, Inc. v. United States, 610 F.2d 770 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
33 See, e.g., Certain Optic Liquid Level Sensing Systems from Canada, 44 Fed. Reg. 1728 (1979) (final
countervailing duty determination).
34 See, e.g., Bromine and Brominated Compounds from Israel, 43 Fed. Reg. 56746 (1978) (final countervailing duty determinations).
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Trade Act of 197435 represented a temporary compromise. On the one hand, the
Treasury Secretary was authorized to waive countervailing duties during a four
year period in contemplation of concluding trade agreements to reduce trade
barriers. 36 On the other hand, for the first time, the Secretary was placed under
time limits for acting on complaints, and complainants were afforded the right to
judicial review of negative Treasury determinations. 37 Thus, the 1974 Act foreshadowed future developments: the waiver provisions amounted to a tacit acknowledgement that an injury test was needed, while the time limits and judicial
review provisions indicated that the Secretary's virtually unbridled discretion
was to be brought under the rein of law.
The 1974 Trade Act provided the legal basis for U.S. participation in multilateral negotiations to establish international rules governing subsidies. The
Multilateral Trade Negotiations were primarily concerned with negotiating a
trade-off in which the U.S. would adopt an injury test if its trading partners
would accept rules moderating subsidies and their impact on international trade.
3.

Current Countervailing Duty Law

The result of these negotiations, insofar as they became implemented in U.S.
law, was the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,38 which significantly revises U.S.
practice in the countervailing duty area. If the changes constitute a mosaic, it is
one structured by the transformation of administrative discretion into a more
rule-bound, adversarial process.
For the first time, the term "subsidy" has been subjected to statutory definition. 39 In addition, various "offsets" which formerly had given the Treasury De40
partment considerable flexibility in calculating subsidies have been eliminated.
All decisions are ultimately subject to judicial review. 4 1 Abbreviated statutory
timetables, coupled with the need to provide a record sufficiently documented to
be fit for judicial scrutiny, 42 give the new adminstering authority (now part of
the Commerce Department rather than the Treasury Department) much less
room for maneuverability in tempering the law's application.
Internationally, countervailing duty disputes are treated as matters to be
resolved between governments. Under the Trade Agreements Act, however,
while the administering authority may initiate a countervailing duty investigation sua sponte,43 the alternative process-and one likely to remain the rule, as in
the past 44 -is for an interested party to initiate an investigation by petition. In
35 The Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487
(1976) and in scattered sections of 5, 26 and 28 U.S.C.).
36 Id. § 331 (amending the Tariff Act of 1930, § 303(d), 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d) (1976)).
37 Id. (amending the Tariff Act of 1930, § 303(a)(4), 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(4) (repealed by Pub. L. No.
96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 190 (1979)).
38 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (to be codified in scattered sections
of 19 U.S.C.).
39 Id. § 101 (adding § 771(5) to the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5) (West 1980)).
40 Id. (adding § 771(6), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(6) (West 1980)).
41 Id. § 1001(a) (adding § 516A, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a (West 1980)).

42 Id. (adding § 516A(b)(2), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(b)(2) (West 1980)).
43 Id. § 101 (adding § 702, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671a (West 1980)).
44 Executive disinclination to initiate countervailing duty proceedings has rested on the generally sensible "squeeky wheel" theory-that unless an industry complains of a problem, the United States government ought not to create problems. Moreover, lack of complaint may foreshadow inadequate cooperation
by the domestic industry in the injury phase of the proceedings. But under § 101 of the Trade Agreements
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short, whether the product in question be butter cookies from Denmark45 or
manhole covers from India, 46 an investigation will typically be compelled by a
segment of the affected domestic industry. Foreign firms will have every reason
to be drawn into the fray, either to deny their utilization of proffered benefits or
to submit data on prices and customers to counter domestic claims of material
injury. Thus, commercial adversaries will to a large extent supplement if not
replace governments as the principal parties in countervailing duty actions.
In tune with the adversarial posture of the proceedings, administrative procedures have become increasingly judicialized hearings, replete with briefs and
legal argumentation. 47 With certain limited exceptions, participants' business
records and the administering authority's entire file-particularly of ex parle
meetings with its decisionmakers 4 8 -must be accessible. Only in certain narrowly circumscribed circumstances can an investigation be suspended or settled
49
"out of court."
At virtually every stage in the proceedings, judges will be looking over the
shoulders of the administrators. Preliminary countervailing duty determinations-including decisions not to institute an investigation or to extend the time
limits of investigations, International Trade Commission findings that there is no
reasonable indication of material injury, and the administering authority's determinations that there is no reasonable basis to believe subsidization exists-all will
be subject to interlocutory review. 50 Parties can appeal to the courts to order
disclosure of confidential information. 51 And because all final determinations
will be subject to "on the record" review under a substantial evidence standard
upon challenge by an interested party, 52 administrative processes must, of necessity, become formal and self-conscious preliminaries to judicial resolutions.
Related to the subject of countervailing duties is an area in which current
solutions are immune to comment since they do not yet even exist. I refer to the
Act of 1979, id. (adding § 777, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677f (West 1980)), the administering authority is obliged to
maintain a library of foreign subsidy practices to facilitate private filings, id., 93 Stat. at 187 (to be codified
at 19 U.S.C. § 16770, and the related Senate Report urges the administering authority not to hesitate
before self-initiation, S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 14, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 400. Such self-initiation might occur if a foreign government lured a domestic producer to build a
plant to manufacture goods for export to the United States (e.g., if the Michelin tire plant that was the
object of the proceeding in X-Radial Steel Belted Tires from Canada, 38 Fed. Reg. 1018 (1973), had been
American owned) and the other American producers-for whatever reason--declined to file. Reducing
such international contests for plant locations has been a high priority of the United States government.
45 Butter Cookies from Denmark, 43 Fed. Reg. 956 (1978) (final countervailing duty determination).
46 Certain Iron Metal Castings from India, 45 Fed. Reg. 66915 (1980) (final determination of material
injury).
47 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (adding § 774 to the Tariff
Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677c (West 1980)).
48 Id. (adding § 777(a)(3), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677f(a)(3) (West 1980)).
49 Id. (adding § 704, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1672c (West 1980)).
50 Id. (adding § 516A(a)(2)(B), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(a)(2)(B) (West 1980)).
51 Elaborate regulations concerning access to confidential information are codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355,
pt. B (1980). See also Connors Steel Company v. United States, 2 I.T.R.D. 1129 (BNA) (Cust. Ct. 1980)
(No. C.R.D. 80-09). Connors Steel Company, a domestic steel company, contested an administrative determination that certain Belgian steel beams were not being sold in the United States at less than fair value
and requested production of business information submitted by steel manufacturers under a pledge of

confidentiality to the Customs Service. After the Government's motion for an order barring disclosure,
Connors Steel moved to compel discovery. The United States Customs Court granted that motion, reasoning that the most equitable solution was to permit disclosure in a manner which would allow information
to be examined by lawyers for Connors Steel for litigation purposes but would forbid further disclosure.
52 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (adding § 516A(a)(2) to the
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(a)(2) (West 1980)).
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problem of coping with trade from state-controlled economies. When the price
levels of components in the productive process are uniformly established by government decree, all products may be considered "subsidized" by the state.
Under regulations once proposed by the Treasury Department (but since withdrawn by the Commerce Department), subsidy determinations would have been
based on a finding of sales at "less-than-fair-value" under the antidumping laws,
using a constructed-value formula based upon similar merchandise produced in a
53
non-state-controlled economy at a comparable stage of economic development.
This is the approach finally sanctioned by the GATT. Code on Subsidies. 54 The
many technical problems involved in administering the formula reflect the conceptual difficulties of quantifying government "aid" when government involvement is omnipresent. But at least the formula applies a standard, developed after
much effort in the context of the infamous antidumping case of Golf Carsfrom
Poland.55 The formula is premised on the view that if imports from state-controlled economies are priced at less than reasonable competitive value, domestic
competitors do not care whether the rubic under which the cure is administered
is that of "countervailing duty" or that of "antidumping," a topic to which we
now turn.
B. Antidumping Law
1. History of Antidumping Law
Antidumping law had its origins in the xenophobic World War I era, fanned
by the fear that European cartels would flood American markets with cheap,
stockpiled merchandise, financing such U.S. sales through the high priced home
market sales the cartels controlled. The Antidumping Act of 1916,56 which condemns importation of goods at unfair price levels, requires proof of an intent to
injure industry or to monopolize trade in the United States. Although the Act
carries criminal sanctions, for all practical purposes it has been a dead letter.
Congress tried again in 1921. Eschewing criminal punishment and private
civil damage remedies, the 1921 Act provided for sanctions in the form of antidumping duties.5 7 Enforcement of the new law was taken out of the courts and
lodged in the Treasury Department. Administrative proceedings could be initiated by private parties complaining of injury caused by dumped imports, whereupon the Treasury Secretary would conduct an inquiry to determine whether
foreign merchandise was being sold at less than its "fair value."'5 8 Like a line
drive judged by a baseball umpire, a price was "fair" if the Secretary said so.
Although the language of the Antidumping Act of 1921 was amended from
time to time, the contours of antidumping law-and its problems-remained
53 Proposed Revision of the Customs Regulations Relating to Countervailing Duties, 44 Fed. Reg.
57044, 57047 (1979). This proposal was not included in the final regulations. See 45 Fed. Reg. 4932, 4933
(1980).
54 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done April 12, 1979, MTN/NTM/W/236, pt. IV at 28.
55 See Electric Golf Cars from Poland, 45 Fed. Reg. 39581 (1980) (determination of no further injury)
for a history of this extended proceeding.
56 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976).
57 The Antidumping Act of 1921, § 209, 42 Stat. 11 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 168 (1976)
(repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 193 (1979)).
58 See 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1976) (repealed and replaced by 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673 (West 1980)).
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fairly constant through the years. Perhaps the central problem was that antidumping action focused on sheerpricedierences between the exporter's sales in
his home market and his sales here, regardless of whether the U.S. price levels
were competitive. If an exporter is a monopolist at home or if his home market is
otherwise sheltered, his prices here ought to be lower than abroad. So long as
those prices are competitive in the American market, it can be argued, American
consumers should be able to reap the benefits. And the legislative history of the
Trade Act of 1974 does suggest that such dumping should be regarded as "technical" and noninjurious. 59 The International Trade Commission even pays occasional heed to the suggestion-although it is not expressly a part of the law.
Current administration of the law follows the initiation of a proceeding by
the particular domestic producers who invoke the statute, 60 and who effectively
"control the action" thereafter. Thus, proceedings may be brought regarding
imports from a country which is not the primary source of a dumping problem.
For example, the large case brought in 1980 by United States Steel 6' regarding a
variety of carbon steel products focused solely on shipments from the European
Economic Community although many thought more tonnage, at larger margins
more likely to cause market disruption, was coming from Japan, Canada and
certain other countries. This may suggest that private interests play too large a
role in shaping antidumping remedies. Ironically, however, the role is also too
small, since domestic complainants are not compensated for any injuries they
may suffer at the hands of dumping predators. As a result, domestic producers
have little to lose in initiating complaints, but nothing to gain in recoupable
damages.
The U.S. Treasury, rather than injured domestic competitors, benefits from
the imposition of antidumping duties. Under the law, once the Secretary makes
a finding of less-than-fair-value sales, the precise magnitude of the duty to be
extracted is calculated in accordance with exquisitely detailed statutory characterizations of "foreign market value" and "purchase price."'62 The time required
to conduct these complex calculations necessarily allows relief to be delayed.
Also, investigations to establish the appropriate variables often compel the U.S.
government to confront foreign firms and governments at politically undesirable
or inconvenient times. But no real flexibility is accorded government administrators to apply overriding considerations of economic or foreign policy. The law
says: Go forward and damn the torpedoes.
2.

The 1974 Act: Cost of Production Insight
For fifty years, the antidumping regime was concerned exclusively with
price differentials between a foreign exporter's domestic and U.S. sales. The
Trade Act of 1974 introduced a new economic insight based on the concept of
cost recovery. 63 Henceforth, if the Secretary determined that significant sales in
59

See S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1974).

60 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673a(b) (West 1980); 19 C.F.R. § 353.36 (1980).
61 See Certain Carbon Steel Products From Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, 45 Fed. Reg. 21404 (1980) (institution of preliminary antidumping investigation).
62 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1677a-1677b (West 1980); 19 C.F.R. § 353, pt. A (1980) (covering 14 columns of
fine print at 45 Fed. Reg. 8191 (1980)).
63 Trade Act of 1974, supra note 35, § 321(d) (amending Antidumping Act of 1921, supra note 53,

[Vol. 56:595]

"JUDICIALIZATION" OF TRADE LAW

the domestic market were at prices that did not allow costs of production to be
recovered within a reasonable period of time, then those prices could not establish a "fair" value for the goods in question. Rather, either remaining sales not
below cost or their "construed value" would be used to establish the critical standard of comparison, the constructed value being equal to the total cost of materials plus added margins of ten percent for general expenses and eight percent for
profits. This approach complements a policy of preserving fair competition, since
persistent sales below cost are a badge of inefficiency.
A company that consistently fails to recover costs should not long survive.
Indeed, it cannot if it is not being assisted-propped up, if you will-by its government or some other external source of support. Many countries, including our
own, help maintain failing sectors of the economy for a variety of historic, developmental, and security reasons. Moreover, when a major industry fails, the social costs of adjustment, including unemployment and dislocation, may be such
that a producer or its government will prefer to maintain a fixed output while
absorbing the losses. Export sales at a loss then shift the problems abroad, effectively "exporting unemployment." This was the real target of the below-costsales amendment to the Antidumping Act, and this section is now its most significant provision.
It should be noted, however, that in times of contracting demand (such as all
industrial countries are currently experiencing), it may be entirely rational for
producers to sell at less than fully allocated costs. If demand fluctuations are due
to a local business cycle, for example, prices sufficient to recover variable costs
may minimize long-run production costs over the entire cycle. The law has been
inadequately developed to reflect the requisite sensitivity to differences between
marginal costs, average variable costs, average total costs, and other conceptual
permutations, however.
One fresh approach for coping with a rising tide of antidumping disputes
was initiated in 1978 in response to complaints from the American steel industry.
A trigger price mechanism (TPM) grounded on production costs of the world's
most efficient industry as a whole-the Japanese--established a reference price
for all carbon steel imports into the United States. 64 The TPM promised an
cautomatic" investigation of possible dumping whenever significant steel imports, regardless of their point of origin, fell below the trigger price. In calculating trigger prices, the Treasury Department sought to incorporate the economic
insight that fixed costs should be allocated over a period coinciding with a realistic investment planning cycle rather than with the arbitrary period of investigation instigated by an antidumping petition. 65 But a troubled steel industry has
adding § 205b, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976)) (repealed and replaced by 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b(b)
(West 1980)). The important consideration for a finding of "dumping" is the margin between the "foreign
market value" of the merchandise exported to the United States and the "purchase price" of that merchandise in the United States. Naturally, a lower "foreign market value" reduces the possibility of a dumping margin. Domestic sales uniformly made at less than the cost of production could, if used in the
calculation, so reduce the "foreign market value" of the goods that no margins of dumping would be
found, even if all sales in both the home market and the United States were at a loss. Consistent sales at a
loss are not regarded as "fair" competition in either domestic or international trade.
64 See 43 Fed. Reg. 1464 (1978) (Treasury Department announcement of base prices to be used in the
trigger price mechanism).
65 See 44 Fed. Reg. 59742, 59748 (1979) (proposed regulation 19 C.F.R. § 153.7). The proposed regulation would have established one year as the norm for this purpose but would have allowed evidence of a
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not been enamored of the theoretical niceties of the system, and Treasury's TPM
was abandoned in favor of a dumping complaint against the Europeans. 6 6 The
Commerce Department then decided to add a further pull to "triggers": a socalled "anti-surge" mechanism. 67 On that basis the dumping case was with68
drawn in October 1980 and TPM reinstated.
3. Current Antidumping Law
Under the Antidumping Act of 1921, a cabinet-level official was given responsibility for determining whether imports were being sold in the United
States at less than their fair value. 69 Since "fair value" was left undefined, the
determination was necessarily as much a matter of trade policy as of prices-an
exercise of political judgment rather than mere arithmetic.
Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 "fair value" remains undefined.
'70
Nevertheless, the term has come to mean the same as "foreign market value,"
one of those long-winded concepts for which our Internal Revenue Code, among
many laws, is justly famous. While the determination of "foreign market value"
now includes some leeway by permitting averaging techniques 7 1 and the disregard of "insignificant" adjustments, 72 these are largely matters of technical, not
normative, discretion. The upshot of current law and administration is that antidumping complaints are likely to stand or fall on the basis of a lower-level bureaucrat's price computations, rather than on a senior official's comprehensive
market analysis. Discretion is further confined by the need to establish a record
which can withstand the judicial review available to any "interested party" who
73
chooses to appeal an antidumping determination.
Administrative judgment thus has less space under the new trade law; it also
has less time. A principal objective of the 1979 Act was to expedite both antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings. Since shorter time periods are
presumably a spur to more vigorous enforcement, 74 the Secretary of Commerce
longer period. (In the TPM, a five-year period was used.) The "period of investigation" in most proceedings is a six-month period comprising the 150 days before and 30 days after the first day of the month in

which an antidumping petition is filed. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.38(a) (1980).
66 Certain Carbon Steel Products from Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, 45 Fed. Reg. 21404 (1980) (institution of preliminary antidumping investigation).

67 See 45 Fed. Reg. 66834 (1980) (reinstatement of the steel trigger price mechanism).
68 See Carbon Steel Rolled Sheet, Hot Rolled Sheet, Galvanized Sheet, Plate and Structural Shapes
from Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom, 45 Fed. Reg. 66833 (1980) (petitions withdrawn).
69 The Antidumping Act of 1921, § 201, 42 Stat. 11.
70 See H.R. REP. No.317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1979). The House Report states: "The term fair
value is not defined in current law nor in the bill. The Committee intends the concept to be applied
essentially as an estimate of 'foreign market value' during the period of investigation so as to provide the

Authority with greater flexibility in administration of the law." While "fair value" can be less precise than
foreign market value, the methodology used to determine either must be essentially identical. See 19
C.F.R. § 353.1 (1980).
71 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b(l) (West 1980).
72 Id. § 1677b(2).
73 The Department of Commerce is charged with maintaining the official record of antidumping
proceedings. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(a) (1980). Any "interested party" who is a party to the proceeding
may appeal an antidumping determination. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(l) and (2) (West 1980).
74 For example, see the statement of Rep. John H. Buchanan, Jr., vice chairman of the congressional
steel caucus, lamenting "the unfortunate reticence of [the United States] Government to enforce the trade
laws which the Congress has passed to protect this country from the deleterious effects of price discrimination in foreign commerce." Multilateral Trade Negott'ations: Hearings Before the Subcomra on Trade ofthe House
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now has twenty (rather than thirty) days to determine whether an investigation
will commence; 75 the International Trade Commission must rule on whether
there is a reasonable indication of injury within forty-five days; 76 a preliminary
determination of whether there have been sales at less than fair value must
oridinarily fall within 160 days (rather than six months) after an investgiation is
initiated;7 7 and other statutory timetables are similarly abbreviated. At this
early stage it is difficult to predict whether the "rush to judgment" will in fact
produce forceful administration, or whether it will have other, unanticipated
consequences-such as providing harried administrators with an incentive to
eliminate weak cases as quickly as possible. The recent decision of the Court of
International Trade reversing the International Trade Commission's determination of "no reasonable indication of injury" in the case of Rail Carsfrom Zlal and
Japan78 is a case in point; it was based in large part on alleged "oversights" of
relevant facts in the record before the agency.
Clearly, the same basic set of procedures-with relatively minor adjustments
to timetables for extraordinarily complex cases79 -- must accommodate all antidumping disputes, regardless of size. But it is questionable whether mechanisms which may be appropriate for determining whether coathangers from
Canada8° are being dumped are adequate when the challenge involves virtually
all the steel imported from Europe. The sheer complexity of the biggest cases is
illustrated by the Japanese TV fiasco, in which the Treasury Department, after
finding that dumping had occurred, fell more than seven years behind in assessing duties.81 Cases which are "mountains"-involving such industries as steel,
automobiles, and televisions-are not amenable to treatment with a set of jewelers' needles. On the other hand, cases which amount to "molehills" hardly warrant potentially damaging government-to-government confrontations.
Administrative proceedings in the antidumping area, like those in the area
of countervailing duties, are now more "judicial" than ever before. Interested
parties are granted the right to submit briefs as well as present oral arguments at
hearings. 8 2 All information relied upon in making a final dumping determination must normally be verified, 83 and there is provision for maximum disclosure
Comm on Wars and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 332 (1979); Dumping: House Committee Members, Witnesses
Clash Over Antidumping Enforcement ofSteel, [1980] 8 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA), at A-I. See aso Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § I(e) (4). (congressional statement of purposes) (to be codified
at 19 U.S.C. § 2502(4)).
75 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673a(c) (West 1980).

76 Id. § 1673b(a).
77 Id. § 1673b(b)(1).
78 See The Budd Co., Ry. Div. v. United States, 15 Cust. B. & Dec. 68 (Dec. 29, 1980) (Bulletin No. 4
(Jan. 28, 1981)). This case reversed the ITC's determination of "no reasonable indication of injury" in
Rail Passenger Cars and Parts Thereof Intended for Use as Original Equipment in the United States from
Italy and Japan, 45 Fed. Reg. 11942 (1980).

79 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673b(c)(West 1980).
80 See Steel Wire Coat and Garment Hangers from Canada, 44 Fed. Reg. 29, 990 (1979) (determination of no reasonable indication of injury).
81 See Television Receiving Sets, Monochrome and Color from Japan, antidumping investigationsinitiated, 33 Fed. Reg. 8851 (1968), determinationofsales at less thanfairvalue, 35 Fed. Reg. 18549 (1970), determination ofinjug, 36 Fed. Reg. 4576 (1971) (Investigation No. AA1921-66, TC Pub. No. 367), notice offrding of
dumping (T.D. 71-76, 36 Fed. Reg. 4597 (1971)). See also Oversight of the Antidumping Act of 1921: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways andMeans, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977) (statement
of Robert H. Mundheim, General Counsel, U.S. Treasury Department).
82 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1677c(a), 1675(a), (c), (d) (West 1980).
83 Id. § 1677e.
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of data submitted to or considered by administering authorities. Although investigations may be terminated by a complaining party's withdrawal of petition,
strictures hedge in the capacity of administrators to negotiate settlements.8 4
Here too executive discretion retreats before the advancing march of law.
III.

"Judicialization"-A Questionable Course
A. Benetis of the Exzsing System

The preceding description of current antidumping and countervailing duty
law reveals a clear trend: the process of policymaking in U.S. international trade
is being increasingly transformed into a system of quasi-adjudication. The Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, along with other new developments such as the Customs
Court Act of 1980,85 signal the conversion of flexible, policy-sensitive administrative instruments into the traditional tools and techniques of litigation. Plowshares are being beaten into legal swords.
Even aside from the pecuniary rewards that trade lawyers may anticipate,
there are undeniable advantages associated with the new regime. Perhaps the
most general benefit is that with the adoption of a judicial model for resolving
disputes, an apparent depoliticization of the trade arena results.
From a domestic perspective, this means that Congress and the Executive
Branch can avoid tough decisions by defering to impersonal (and presumably
impartial) administrative/judicial mechanisms. Since in an adjudicatory process
the decisionmaker is obzged to be insulated from extrinsic influences, a "hands
off" policy becomes a virtue born of necessity. From an international perspective, the case-by-case approach mandated by the new regime creates the impression that the larger problems of trade relations will neatly resolve themselves into
delimited disputes, each to be dealt with individually and on its "merits." The
whole process is structured to give observers the comfortable impression that a set
of neutral and accepted rules will be applied disinterestedly to yield consistent
results-just the sort of comfort that legal systems are designed to give.
In addition to being quasi-adjudicatory processes, countervailing duties and
antidumping inquiries, though ordinarily instigated by private petitioners, are
carried out by U.S. government agencies. This too has its salutary effects. If
complaints regarding trade practices were left entirely in the control of private
parties, challenged foreign competitors would likely be very reluctant to submit
sensitive information regarding their business practices, including price data and
customer lists. For sake of comparison, witness the extraordinary lengths to
which antitrust defendants will go in fending off discovery of competitive data.
While some recent court decisions ordering disclosure of business information
submitted under a pledge of confidentiality by foreign manufacturers cut the
other way86 (for they will surely inhibit future submissions), those accused of
dumping and subsidization should at least theoretically be more compliant when
the investigation is conducted under the imprimatur of the U.S. government.
Another feature that may make the current system attractive is its forward84 Id. §§ 1673c(b), (c), (d).
85 Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 101 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 251).
86 See, e.g., Connors Steel Co. v. United States, 2 ITRD 1129 (BNA) (Cust. Ct. 1980); Southwest Fla.
Winter Vegetable Growers Ass'n v. Miller, I ITRD (BNA) 1142 (D.D.C. 1979).
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looking orientation. Because remedies are limited to duty assessments on future
imports, there is no preoccupation with expiating past "guilt." In addition to
streamlining the required inquiry, this limitation on liability may compensate
foreign firms for the fact that U.S. complainants are shielded from counterclaims.
In perspective, then, the current adjudicatory model has its inviting aspects.
Principled decisionmaking undoubtedly appeals to us-if only as a matter of
principle. Transforming trade disputants into litigants, administrators into
judges, and proceedings into trials makes for a brave new world. But it may not
be the best of all possible worlds. It may not even be as good as the old one.
As a prelude to the suggestions which follow, it is worth noting that rulebound, adjudicatory systems have their own peculiar characteristics which, like
those of the digestive system, modify raw materials in the very process of assimilating them. Thus, because the adjudicatory process is focused on a particular
complaint, particular parties, and particular facts, it is not concerned to-indeed,
is not supposed to-issue forth judgments on alternative scenarios or "hypothetical" cases. Because adjudication is piecemeal and incremental, extending only to
the issues presented, it may artificially isolate and separate factors which are actually interconnected. Because decisions tend to become sanctified as precedent
(the law is loath to give the appearance of fickleness), backtracking and changing
course is inhibited. Because adjudicatory bodies are passive, only acting when
litigants call, their agendas are shaped by the vagaries of private initiative. Yet
because they are supposed to be responsive (they must act when litigants call, and
within a delimited period of time), decisions may be hasty, forced, or made on an
adhoc basis. Finally, the need to appeal to preexisting rules or general principles
lends to legal processes an essentially conservative nature; they adapt to external
changes, if at all, in an ex postfacto manner.
All this is not to say, of course, that an adjudicatory model should be entirely abandoned in the trade area. Rather, what is needed is a recognition of the
adjudicatory model's distinctive biases and limitations. The question is whether
and to what extent such a model is adapted to the needs of the subject matter. In
turn this question depends upon what we think our trade laws should do.
B.

PerceivedDefriencies

The ultimate objective of U.S. trade law in the countervailing duty and
antidumping areas can be stated with breathtaking simplicity: to preserve fair
competition in the American market. There are other subsidiary goals, not the
least of which is some measure of protection for U.S. industry in a world not yet
completely open to trade based solely on comparative advantage. Nonetheless,
the animating premise of countervailing duty and antidumping rules is that price
discrimination and subsidization unfairly affect competition by requiring domestic producers to meet artificially low import prices.
But if the goal is clear, the effectiveness of current law is much less so. Data
simply do not exist to demonstrate that individual determinations of subsidization or dumping, much less the mere existence of the countervailing duty or antidumping laws, have provided meaningful preventive or remedial relief to those
industries invoking the law, or that they have cleansed the market of trade-distortive practices. What we do know is that the procedures are costly to both the

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[April 19811

government and to affected parties, that the number of cases is growing, and that
there is no perceptible abatement of industry complaints. 87 It is a notorious fact
that under the older trade law regime, the biggest cases-those involving the
largest trade volumes-never yielded concrete benefits: automobile antidumping
proceedings were discontinued in 1976,88 petitions in a series of steel cases were
withdrawn in 197889 and 198090 after adoption and reintroduction of the trigger
price mechanism, and most of the countervailing duty actions in the textile industry eventuated in negative determinations in 1979.91
We also know that under the new regime there continues to be no provision
for the compensation of injured parties. Whether small added duties--in an era
in which exchange rates may fluctuate more within a week than the entire margin of dumping to be remedied-serve a deterrent or other useful purpose is unknown. The high cost of participating in these proceedings and the risks involved
in releasing sensitive business data would seem to constitute equally (and perhaps
more) important reasons for foreign concern about our trade laws. Our efforts to
be fair pursuant to new codes liberalizing trade may actually have resulted in the
erection of a new "non-tariff barrier" known as legal expenses.
What is surprising is that in the past, countervailing duty and antidumping
actions actually concluded have generally been peripheral to our major economic
concerns. 92 But if those laws are in fact proper only'for those types of cases, is the
enormous relative increase in resources needed to administer an adjudicatory
process, as now contemplated, worthwhile? According to recent General Accounting Office estimates, the traditional program cost $1.1 million in 1975, $1.4
87 Administration of the Antidumping Act of 1921. Hearingson the Assessment and Collectionof Duties Under the
Antidunping Act of 1921 Before the Subcomm. on Tradeof the House Ways andMeans Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,

4 (1978) (statement of Robert H. Mundheim, then General Counsel of the U.S. Treasury Department and
the delegate of the Secretary for decisionmaking under the Act).
88 Automobiles from Belgium, discontinued, 41 Fed. Reg. 34982 (1976) (discontinuance based on commitment of exporters to revise prices); Automobiles from Canada, discontinued, 41 Fed. Reg. 34983 (1976)
(same); Automobiles from France, discontinued, 41 Fed. Reg. 34984 (1976) (same); Automobiles from Italy,
discontinued, 41 Fed. Reg. 34985 (1976) (same); Automobiles from Japan, discontinued, 41 Fed. Reg. 34986
(1976) (same); Automobiles from Sweden, discontinued, 41 Fed. Reg. 34987 (1976) (same); Automobiles
from the United Kingdom, discontinued, 41 Fed. Reg. 34988 (1976) (same); Automobiles from West Germany, discontinued, 41 Fed. Reg. 34989 (1976) (same).
89 Certain Carbon Steel Sheets, Plates, Pipes, and Tubes, and Structural Products from Japan, 43
Fed. Reg. 9212 (1978) (petitions withdrawn).
90 Carbon Steel Cold Rolled Sheet, Hot Rolled Sheet, Galvanized, Plat and Structural Shapes from
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom, 45 Fed. Reg. 66833 (1980) (petitions withdrawn).
91 Certain Textiles and Textile Products from Malaysia, negative determination, 44 Fed. Reg. 41001
(1979); Certain Textiles and Textile Products from Mexico, negative determination, 44 Fed. Reg. 41003
(1979); Certain Textiles and Textile Products from Singapore, negative determination, 44 Fed. Reg. 35334
(1979). An affirmative determination was made in Certain Textiles and Textile Products from Pakistan,
countervailing duty imposed by T.D. 79-188, 44 Fed. Reg. 40884 (1979).
92 See, e.g., Steel Wire Coat and Garment Hangers from Canada, antidumpinginvestigation initiated, 44
Fed. Reg. 23623 (1979), determination of "no reasonable indicationof injug or likelihood of inju,," 44 Fed. Reg.
29990 (1979), terminated, 44 Fed. Reg. 35335 (1979); Automotive and Motorcycle Repair Manuals from the
United Kingdom, antidumping investigation initiated, 43 Fed. Reg. 35139 (1978), determination of "a reasonable
idicationof inuy," 43 Fed. Reg. 40935 (1978), terminated,43 Fed. Reg. 45932 (1978) (termination based on
provision of "Florence Agreement" that such merchandise shall be imported free of any "customs duties or
other charges"); Ampicillin Trihydrate from Spain, countervailing duty investigation initiated, 43 Fed. Reg.
22479 (1978), countervailing duty imposed by TD.79-90, 44 Fed. Reg. 17484 (1979); Steel Wire Strand for
Prestressed Concrete from India, antidumping investigation initiated, 42 Fed. Reg. 60034 (1977), withholding of
appraisementand determinationofsales at less thanfairvalue, 43 Fed. Reg. 23672 (1978), determinationofno ijuy,
43 Fed. Reg. 38951 (1978).

[Vol. 56:595]

"JUDICIALIZATION" OF TRADE LAW

million in 1976, and $1.1 million in 1977. 9 3 The cost of the trigger price mechanism, estimated at $1.9 million in 1978, more than doubled these costs within a
single year to a total of $3.9 million. 94 The amount and quality of manpower
needed to investigate, adjudicate and then "enforce" the new laws properly
within the tightened time limits and in light of increased caseloads, requires at
least a further fourfold increase in those costs. 95 There is no guarantee that the
benefits will rise to the level of the costs or that anyone is even asking for the data
upon which to make the needed judgment. We have never known and do not
know today what trade is actually affected by these cases, how much in duties we
actually collect, or how many of our exports are adversely affected by foreign
antidumping actions. Such analyses are time consuming and boring. As a recent
study by Common Cause on the efficacy of reports by the General Accounting
Office has observed, there is no political profit in oversight. 96 Programs count;
follow-up clouds the eyes.
C. Suggestions For A Difterent System
In order to fashion trade laws which are both true to their mission and effective in operation it is necessary, not to extirpate all of the recent "judicializing"
trends, but to assign them a more appropriate role in the system. In this regard,
a fundamental distinction must be made between smaller cases in which (ironically) the adjudicatory trend has not gone far enough, and the "big" cases in
which it has gone too far.
For typical small cases involving neither enormous volumes of trade nor sensitive issues in international relations, an adjudicatory procedure seems most
workable and fitting. Since most small antidumping cases are essentially disputes
between private parties concerning their respective behavior in the U.S. market,
simple private damage actions should suffice, provided government intervention
is possible if larger trade policy issues come into play. Since countervailing duty
cases by their nature address foreign government programs, they are less susceptible to private suit. However, it seems advisable to allow a party claiming competitive injury resulting from a subsidy to bring an action against the beneficiary
of the party allegedly receiving the benefits.
Aside from the fact that it would be in tune with our recent political predilection to reduce the degree of government intervention in the economy, the introduction of a traditional litigation format in the minor cases forming the bulk
of the workload serves several useful functions: It would avoid the artificial time
limitations imposed by current administrative procedures, entitle injured parties
93 U.S.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ANTIDUMPING ACT OF 1921:

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL 4 (1979).

94 Id.
95 Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, 93 Stat. 559, authorized funds
for 130 new position for antidumping and countervailing duty administration, see S. REP. No. 229, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1979), compared to the 79 positions working in that area (including a large group
solely devoted to the trigger price mechanism) that were transferred from the Treasury Department to the
Commerce Department pursuant to § 2(a) of Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg.
69273, 69274 (1979).
96 COMMON CAUSE, ADDING BARK TO THE BITE: A COMMON CAUSE STUDY OF THE GAO, THE
GOVERNMENT'S WATCHDOG 17 (1981).
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to recover damages, and even contribute to good international relations by reducing the needless irritation of frequent government face-offs.
The "big" cases are another matter. These are disputes which, because of
the quantity of the affected trade or the quality of the issues, raise fundamental
questions about the direction of our international relations, national security, labor policy, domestic economic planning, or foreign affairs. To what extent do
certain kinds of foreign practices-say, absence of environmental protection or
lack of minimum wages--constitute subsidization of the goods produced under
these conditions? What will trade sanctions do to our non-trade relationship
with an exporting nation, especially when that relationship is at a critical juncture? How will our efforts to curb inflation be affected by massive antidumping
reverberations shutting out products that provide competition and fill consumer
needs unrecognized or unfilled by our producers? How can we continue to promote development of the less developed countries if we must apply countervailing duties to the very products we are urging-and helping-them to make
and sell abroad? Such problems are not amenable to mechanical solutions; they
are not within the special purview of either price calculating technicians or juristic generalists; and they most definitely should not be within the exclusive province of private parties.
In short, these are cases in which the government has an indispensible role to
play. In addition to requiring the sort of comprehensive vision which adjudicatory processes are ill-suited to provide, the problems posed by these cases require
essentially political solutions: they demand an assessment of competing interests
and an accommodation between a diversity of domestic needs and international
tensions. Perhaps only a senior executive official is properly capable of determining whether certain forms of trade relief are in the national interest (indeed, the
President himself is already designated to make this determination under the
1974 Trade Act in so-called "market disruption" 97 and "escape clause" 98 cases).
As in those cases, perhaps Congress should have the final word in determining
whether relief is justified. The recent condemnation by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of one-house vetoes might be avoided if joint
resolutions were required. 99 But more to the point, judicial review would be no
more warranted here than in other areas where the appropriate solutions are
political.
The bifurcated model proposed above in which typical small cases go to
court while large or policy-sensitive cases are pulled off the adjudicatory assembly line, undoubtedly presents difficulties of its own. The very distinction between "big" and "ordinary" cases is not easily drawn. Without government
participation in private suits, it may be difficult to serve "process" on foreign
defendants or to collect and verify data. Private industries may complain if governmentally-imposed "political" solutions lead to injuries in the form of terminated trade contracts, although some form of insurance might be made available
to cover such contingencies. The United States provides such insurance for con97

19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (Supp. 1978).

98 Id. § 2436.
99

See Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
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tracts terminated due to foreign government actions; 100 "political risk" insurance
seems equally suitable vis-a-vis actions of our own bureaucrats. I pretend to possess neither a philosopher's stone nor a blueprint. But I do think we are not likely
to devise an improved system for handling trade disputes if we are not willing to
confront squarely the inadequacies of the present system.
By way of summary, let me highlight the problems I detect by contrasting
what we have now with what might be:
Needed System

Existing System
Reactive to complaints due to failure

Preventive planning to forestall com-

of adjustment.

plaints and anticipate needed adjustments on both sides of international borders.

No compensation to those unfairly in-

Compensation to the injured to aid in
adjustment process.

jured.
Mirospeift in quantifying individu-

al transaction details.
Structured rules and procedures lead-

ing to single remedy.
Confrontational in both domestic and
international arenas.

General approach to problems, handling specifics as part of a comprehensive program.
Flexibility in applying rules and developing remedies.

of trading partners and
our mutual efforts to adjust to new
conditions.

Supportive

Looking across these columns, one cannot be satisfied with the current direction of the law, especially with the trend I have identified as "over-judicialization." I am reminded of the little girl in Boston who, when asked where she
would like to travel when she grew up, replied, "Why should I want to travel
when I am already there?" I am less convinced than that little girl that we have
already arrived. In international trade law, it is precisely where we already are
that should make us want to travel the road of reform.

100 See, e.g., II A. LOWENFELD,
U.S.C.A. § 2194 (West 1979).
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